The armed aggression by the Russian Federation, which began on 19 February 2014 with undeclared and covert incursions into Ukrainian territory by units of the armed forces and other security agencies of the Russian Federation, as well as through the organisation and support of terrorist activities, and which, on 24 February 2022, escalated into an unprovoked and full-scale armed invasion of the sovereign territory of Ukraine, constitutes not only a gross violation by Russia of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, as enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, but also has led to the commission of thousands of international crimes by Russian officials and members of the Russian armed forces.

Consequently, the question clearly arises as to the need to hold Russia, as a state, accountable under international law, and to hold Russian citizens criminally liable under international law for the international crimes they have committed.

At the same time, Russia has a history of abusing the provisions of international law to evade international legal responsibility. In order to safeguard the international legal order, establish a just peace and hold Russia accountable under international law, a number of institutional and jurisdictional obstacles must be taken into account:

Gaps in the ICC’s jurisdiction: Russia signed the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2000 but never ratified it. In 2016, the ICC published a report in which it equated the annexation of Crimea with an occupation. In response, in November 2016, by order of the President of the Russian Federation, Russia officially withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the withdrawal of its signature does not mean that the ICC cannot investigate crimes committed by Russians. On the basis of unilateral declarations by Ukraine, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed on Ukrainian territory, which has enabled the Court to issue arrest warrants for members of the Russian Federation’s leadership.

Status of the UN Security Council: Russia has the right of veto in the UN Security Council, which blocks any decisions regarding the establishment of a mandatory international tribunal through this body.

Personal immunities: Heads of state, prime ministers and foreign ministers enjoy immunity under international law from arrest and prosecution in the national courts of other countries whilst in office.

Sovereign immunity of property: Russian state property abroad is protected by immunity from compulsory enforcement, which makes it difficult to transfer frozen assets to Ukraine without specific legislative decisions by Western countries.

Documentation and assessment of damages: the scale of the destruction inflicted by Russia on Ukraine makes it difficult to carry out a comprehensive, reliable and prompt international assessment of the damage caused, with a view to making final claims for reparations.

Lack of an enforcement mechanism: even if decisions are handed down by international courts or commissions, there is no effective global mechanism to compel the aggressor state to comply with these decisions and pay compensation.

This therefore raises the question of developing and applying mechanisms under international law to ensure that the Russian Federation cannot evade its international legal responsibility, which is, in fact, the aim of this panel discussion.